

Haoyuan Zeng

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EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics (Expected 06/2026) University of Zurich	09/2020 - Present
Junior Visiting Scholar University of Oxford	04/2025 - 06/2025
M.S. in Economics (Summa Cum Laude) University of Zurich	09/2019 - 09/2024
Bachelor of Economics in the Specialty of Finance Peking University	09/2013 - 06/2018
B.S. in Mathematics and Applied Mathematics (Dual Degree) Peking University	09/2015 - 06/2018
Exchange Student University of California, Los Angeles	09/2016 - 12/2016

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Microeconomic Theory, Market Design, Auctions, Dynamic Games.

WORKING PAPERS

Identity-Compatible Auctions (*Job Market Paper*).

Revision requested by the *Journal of Political Economy*.

- This paper studies the incentives of the seller and buyers to shill bid in a single-item auction. An auction is seller identity-compatible if the seller cannot profit from pretending to be one or more bidders via fake identities. It is buyer identity-compatible if no buyer profits from posing as more than one bidder. Lit auctions reveal the number of bidders, whereas dark auctions conceal the information. We characterize three classic selling mechanisms—first-price, second-price, and posted-price—based on identity compatibility. We show the importance of concealing the number of bidders, which enables the implementation of a broader range of outcome rules. In particular, no optimal lit auction is ex-post seller identity-compatible, while the dark first-price auction (with reserve) achieves the goal.

Persuasive Selection in Signaling Games.

Mechanism Design with Information Leakage, with Samuel Häfner and Marek Pycia.

Mediated Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, with Christian Ewerhart.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Insurance Design.

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS

- 2026 Tel Aviv U*, Hebrew U*, Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design* (York).
- 2025 Swiss Theory Day (Basel), World Congress of the Econometric Society (Seoul), Berlin MT & BE PhD Conference, Conference on Economic Design (Essex), Nuffield Student Research Workshop.
- 2024 Swiss Theory Day (Bern), Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design (Budapest).
- (*: scheduled)

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

University of Zurich

Ph.D. Courses

- Microeconomics for Research Students Part IIb, TA for Marek Pycia (2022 Spring, 2023 Spring).
Microeconomics for Research Students Part IIa, TA for Christian Ewerhart (2022 Spring, 2023 Spring).
Microeconomics for Research Students Part I, TA for Nick Netzer (2021 Fall).

Undergraduate Courses

- Smart Contracts and Blockchain Technology, TA for Christian Ewerhart (2022 Fall).

REFEREEING

Econometrica

WORK EXPERIENCE

- PricewaterhouseCoopers Management Consulting 07/2018 - 06/2019
Risk Consulting Associate Beijing, China

HONORS AND AWARDS

- Ph.D. Scholarship, University of Zurich 2019
Ng Teng Fong Merit Scholarship, Peking University 2016
Qihang Exchange Scholarship, Peking University 2016
Leo KoGuan Scholarship, Peking University 2015
Merit Student, Peking University 2015

OTHERS

- Languages: English (fluent), Mandarin Chinese (native).
Software: Python, R, MATLAB, SAS, STATA.
Citizenship: China

REFERENCE

Marek Pycia

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Paul Klemperer

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