Haoyuan Zeng 曾皓原
I am a PhD student in Economics at University of Zurich.
I study microeconomic theory.
My research interests include mechanism design, information design, and auction theory.
Email: haoyuan.zeng@econ.uzh.ch
Working Papers
- Identity-Proof Auctions
- This paper studies the incentives of the seller and buyers to shill bid in a single-item auction. An auction is seller identity-proof, if the seller does not profit from pretending to be one or more buyers; it is buyer identity-proof if no buyer profits from participating via multiple identities. Bayesian identity-proofness implies no profitability in expectation, ex post identity-proofness implies no profitability in any case. Full seller identity-proofness strengthens ex post seller identity-proofness by allowing the auctioneer to deviate from the rules in ways undetectable by buyers who can publicly communicate after the auction. Lit auctions, which might be dynamic, reveal the number of bidders, whereas dark auctions are static and conceal the information. The three most common auction formats are characterized by identity-proofness: The second-price auction maximizes revenue among all ex post buyer identity-proof efficient auctions. The posted-price auction (with suitable price) maximizes revenue among all fully seller identity-proof lit auctions. The dark first-price auction (with suitable reserve) is the unique optimal dark auction that is both fully seller and Bayesian buyer identity-proof. No optimal lit auction is ex post seller identity-proof, highlighting the role of concealing the information about the number of bidders.